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This paper studies the e⁄ect of decentralization of management and control
on forest conservation in the central Himalayas. The density of forest cover
(measured with satellite images and ￿eld surveys) in forests managed by vil-
lage councils is compared with that in state-managed forests and in unman-
aged village commons. Geographic proximity and historical and ecological
information are used to identify the e⁄ects of the three types of management
regimes. Village council management does no worse, and possibly better,
at conservation than state management and costs an order of magnitude
less per unit area. Relative to unmanaged commons, village council man-
agement raises crown cover in broadleaved forests (the type of forest that
may provide the most bene￿ts to villagers under the rules) but not in pine
forests.
Keywords: Decentralization, devolution, community management, com-
mon property, deforestation, conservation.
JEL Codes: O13, Q231 Introduction
Decentralization has moved to the forefront of the discourse on develop-
ment (World Bank, 1999). Yet empirical work that convincingly measures
the impact of decentralization of governance is di¢ cult because it is usually
accompanied by many other changes. As Bardhan (2002) remarks ￿even
though decentralization experiments are going on in many of these [develop-
ing] countries, hard quantitative evidence on their impact is rather scarce￿ .
This paper measures the e⁄ect of a devolution of control of forests to vil-
lage communities in the Indian central Himalayas. The fact that forests
managed by village councils are interspersed with unmanaged village com-
mons and state-managed forests allows the use of geographic and ecological
information to isolate the e⁄ects of property regimes on the density of forest.
Tropical deforestation has received considerable attention in academic
and policy discourse. Tropical forest area has been estimated by remote
sensing to have declined by 0.54 percent per year during the 1990￿ s (Food
and Agriculture Organization, 2000, chapter 1). Less attention has been
paid to degradation of tropical forest, that is, of the loss of biomass from
forests that are not converted to other land uses.1 This is probably because
there are no reliable data on which to base such estimates (FAO, 2000,
chapter 2). However, Duraiappah￿ s (1996) literature review ￿nds several
case studies showing that tropical forest degradation has adversely a⁄ected
the welfare of rural residents owing to shortages of ￿rewood, fodder, inputs
for agriculture and ecological services (see also Dasgupta, 1993, chapter 10).
Moreover, when forests degrade rather than being converted to something
else, there is no compensating gain from a new land use.
Since most tropical forests have multiple users, the possibility of the
￿ tragedy of the commons￿leading to degradation arises. However, a con-
siderable literature on common property has arisen in economics which has
shown, theoretically and by means of case studies and laboratory experi-
ments, that common property does not necessarily lead to over-exploitation
1Foster and Rosenzweig￿ s (2003) study of a⁄orestation in India is unusual in assessing
whether or not there were changes in forest density as well as area.
1of resources (see, for example, Bromley (1992), Ostrom (1990), Ostrom,
Gardner and Walker (1994), and Sethi and Somanathan (1996)).2 The lit-
erature examines conditions under which common-property resource man-
agement is likely to be sustainable and e¢ cient and the sorts of institutions
that promote success.
Developing country governments often centralized control of forests dur-
ing and after the colonial era. Towards the end of the twenthieth century,
however, many countries started experimenting with decentralization in one
form or the other. These include Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, India, Nepal, Thailand, Indonesia, China,
and the Philippines (Edmunds et. al., 2003, Andersson and Gibson, 2004).
As in the case of decentralization in other domains, however, there is scarcely
any quantitative evidence on what impact these policies have had. The case
studies from China, India and the Philippines in Edmunds and Wollenberg
(2003) ￿nd some increases in forest area following decentralization but losses
of grazing and farmland and, in China, increases in monitoring costs under
the household responsibility system. However, it remains unclear how much
of this can be attributed to decentralization. Andersson and Gibson (2004)
review ￿the handful of studies [in Mexico, Indonesia, Bolivia, and Uganda]
that actually use forest condition as an indicator of public policy perfor-
mance￿following decentralization, but conclude that none of them identify
the impact of decentralization on degradation.
In their book Halting Degradation of Natural Resources Baland and Plat-
teau (1996, p. 244) remark that
Everybody seems to agree today that this centralized approach
has been an outright failure in the sense that natural resources
have not been better managed than before. Even though a rig-
orous demonstration is impossible, there are some grounds ...
to believe that things have actually got worse than they would
have been under an alternative management regime. [Emphasis
2When scholarship from other disciplines is included, the common-property literature
is huge. The website of the International Association for the Study of Common Property
lists nearly 40,000 citations in its online bibliography.
2added.]
They go on to detail some of the problems observed with centralized gov-
ernment management of forests and other natural resources.
Edmonds (2002) studied the impact of the formation of forest user groups
in formerly nationalized forests in the Arun valley of Nepal on fuelwood
consumption. His study is unusual in being quantitative and careful in
identi￿cation. He found that household fuelwood consumption in areas with
forest user groups was about 14% lower than in comparable areas without
user groups, which suggests that the groups were restraining harvesting in
order to promote the regeneration of degraded forests. The data on fuelwood
consumption were for 1995-96, within three years of the time of formation
of the ￿rst forest user groups.
In this paper, we compare forests managed by village councils with state-
managed forests to see which property regime did better at conservation,
and at what cost. We also compare council managed village forests with
unmanaged village commons in order to examine whether the existence of
a formal institution to manage the forests led to better forest conservation.
Our study di⁄ers from Edmonds (2002) in that we measure the long-run
impact of decentralized management by village councils on forest stocks
rather than the short-run impact on the ￿ ow of one forest product, and we
also compare the costs of state and community management.
We measure forest degradation with the help of the ￿rst high-resolution
satellite imagery that became available for civilian use in 2000. We combine
our measure of forest density with property regime boundaries derived from
extensive ground surveys and maps. Our method of identifying the e⁄ect of a
property regime exploits the geographic proximity of forests under di⁄erent
regimes to control for unobservable factors that a⁄ect forest density but do
not vary over small distances. We are able to do this because our ground
surveys located property regime boundaries with a high degree of accuracy.
We use historical information and ecological data that we collected to control
for the possibility of endogenous choice of property regime boundaries.
To examine the possibility that forests near property boundaries are not
representative of forests in the area as a whole, we collected data for larger
3areas. We analysed these data using both standard parametric regressions
and propensity-score matching to check whether the results based on forests
close to property boundaries were robust.
We examined the two main types of forest in the area, broadleaved, which
covers about three-fourths of the forest area, and coniferous (mainly pine)
which covers the remaining fourth. We ￿nd that in broadleaved forests, the
existence of a village-level institution for management, raised forest density
signi￿cantly compared to unmanaged village forests, but this was not the
case in pine forests. We also ￿nd that village-council managed forests had
crown cover no lower and possibly higher, than comparable state-managed
forests, both broadleaved and pine. On the cost side, expenditure on state
forests per unit area was an order of magnitude higher than that on village
council forests. We calculate that the annual savings that would accrue if
state forests were managed by village councils would be of the same order
of magnitude as the value of the entire annual production of ￿rewood from
the state forests.
Before going into further details, some background on the region is nec-
essary. We provide this in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. Section 3 presents the model
that derives the long-run forest stock as a function of the property regime
and other variables. Section 4 describes the data used and Section 5 the
estimation and results. Section 6 concludes.
42 Forest Use3
2.1 Physical characteristics
The study area from which the sample was drawn is some 20,000 square
kilometers in extent and comprises most of the eastern half of the state of
Uttaranchal in northern India. It ranges from 300 to over 3000 meters in
altitude. About three-quarters of the area is forest or scrub (Prabhakar et.
al., 2001). Most of the agriculture, and, therefore, the population, is in
elevations from 1000 to 1800 meters. There are two main kinds of forest
in this elevation zone. From 1000 to 1800 meters there are pine (Pinus
roxburghii) forests. From 1500 to 3000 meters, overlapping the range of the
pines, is a broadleaf forest dominated by oaks of the genus Quercus.4
44% of the male labor force and 84% of the female labor force of the state
was in agriculture in 2001 with most of these being owner-cultivators (Census
of India, 2001). Forests are an essential component of agriculture. Leaf
mould from oak forests is an important source of manure, and the forests
are an important source of fodder and grazing for livestock. Cattle dung,
in turn, is used in the preparation of compost for use in crop production.5
The bulk of fuelwood, the main source of energy for heating and cooking,
3This section is based on Somanathan (1991), as well as Government of Uttar Pradesh
(1984), Saxena (1987, 1995), Ballabh and Katar Singh (1988), Aggarwal (1996), Agrawal
(2001), Satyajit Singh (1998), and Somanathan et. al. (forthcoming). Sarin et. al. (2004)
discuss developments in the last six or seven years. They point out that, starting in
the late 1990￿ s, the government created a large number of "paper" council forests from
unmanaged village forests without the informed consent of the villagers, and amended the
Forest Council Rules in 2001 giving forest department o¢ cials powers over the councils and
eroding their autonomy. The description we provide here predates these developments.
4Singh and Singh (1987) provide a detailed description of the forests.
5Ralhan et. al. (1991) found in their study of three villages that 90% of the energy
input into crops was derived from the compost that was "mainly derived from forests".
Tripathi and Sah￿ s (2001) study of three villages found that about one-half of all energy
used in agriculture was derived from forests. Measures of the percentage of fodder derived
from forests range from about one-quarter in two of the villages studied by Tripathi and
Sah (2001) to about one half (Jackson, 1984) to three-quarters in one of the villages studied
by Ralhan et. al. (1991).
5also comes from the forests.6 Timber from pines is used in a limited way
for building but commercial felling was banned by the government in 1981
following concerns about deforestation. Pines are also tapped for resin by
contractors for the state Forest Department.
In addition to harvest ￿ ows from the forest, villagers perceive a direct
bene￿t from the maintenance of the forest stock. The forest reduces runo⁄
during the monsoon and enables percolation of rainwater into the rock, which
is essential for maintaining ￿ ows in springs during the dry season. Water
shortages are acute in many villages in the region, so the villagers see this as
an important issue. Reducing the seasonality of water ￿ ows has enormous
welfare implications for the much larger population of the Gangetic plains
as well.
Despite the importance of maintaining the forest stock, it has degraded.
Prabhakar et. al. (2001) estimate that more than half the forest in the
study area has a crown cover of less than 40% (a commonly used, if arbi-
trary, cuto⁄ for de￿ning a forest as ￿degraded￿ ).7 This has happened owing
to uncoordinated or excessive extractive use. Oaks and other broadleaved
species are lopped for fuelwood and leaf fodder for cattle. Care has to be
taken during lopping to ensure that trees remain productive. When users do
not exercise such care, trees are stunted and may die. Until the 1970￿ s, oak
forests were sometimes felled for making charcoal to be supplied to the hill
towns and military bases. Following felling, grazing and lopping of the new
growth by villagers often prevented e⁄ective regeneration and led to degra-
dation into scrub. Pine saplings and mature trees being tapped for resin are
vulnerable to ￿re. Villagers set ￿re to the forest ￿ oor in pine forests every
spring to promote the growth of grass for their cattle. Fires that burn out
of control are a major source of degradation of pine forest.
688% of the rural population used ￿rewood according to the National Sample Survey
data from 1999-2000.
7Rinki Sarkar and her collaborators also ￿nd considerable degradation based on ground
surveys in areas overlapping our study area and carried out after ours (Sarkar, personal
communication).
62.2 Forest Use: Institutional Aspects
The selection process for inclusion of lands in the di⁄erent property regimes
can be summarized as follows: State forests were demarcated ￿rst, by the
government, followed by demarcation of village council forests over a 70-year
period, requested by villagers and approved in each case by the government,
and unmanaged village forests are left over village commons.
In the nineteenth century, virtually all the forest land was considered by
the villagers to belong to one or another village with well-de￿ned boundaries.
These were sometimes managed, to a greater or lesser extent, by uno¢ cial
councils. Between 1890 and 1920, large areas of forest were demarcated by
the colonial government and declared to be state property so that they could
be commercially and "scienti￿cally" exploited. After this, villagers were
allowed limited rights and privileges to use these state (so-called Reserved)
forests for fuelwood, fodder, grazing and timber. These rights extend to
large blocks of state forests and are not exclusive to particular villages, a
reversal of the situation that prevailed before reservation. Use is regulated
by employees of the state forest department known as ￿forest guards￿ . These
guards may reach tacit understandings with the villagers to overlook illegal
harvesting upto a limit (Vasan 2001).
Large-scale protests by villagers followed the restrictions on their use of
the forests imposed after the second wave of state takeovers in 1911-1920.
In response, restrictions were removed on the villagers￿use of most state oak
forests. This resulted in rapid degradation of oak forests. The government
established the Van Panchayat (literally "forest council") system in 1930 as
a means of arresting the degradation. It was meant to enable the villagers to
form forests to be governed by village councils out of their remaining village
forest, and out of state forests, provided they obtained, on a case-by-case
basis, the consent of the government. In 1972, the state government issued
a new set of much more bureacratic rules which prohibited the transfer of
state forests to village councils and the sale of timber from council forests,
and made it incumbent on the councils to obtain government permission
before felling green trees for local use.
By 1998, more than one-third of the villages in the region had their own
7council forests. The rest use state forests and unmanaged village commons.
Council members, are elected by a show of hands in front of a government
o¢ cial once every ￿ve years. There are usually 5 to 9 members of the
council. The Forest Council Rules empower the councils to make rules and
regulations to restrict and manage harvesting of forest products, and to
levy ￿nes on violators. Nevertheless, they lack the coercive authority of the
state, in that if the accused refuses to pay the ￿ne, a council￿ s only legal
recourse is to approach the government or the courts to recover the ￿ne, a
very costly procedure that is rarely resorted to. Instead, social pressure is
applied to force the violator to pay. Another weakness of the system is that
some councils have no source of revenue other than voluntary contributions
from villagers to pay for a watchman. Others may have revenue from the
sale of contracts for resin-tapping from pine trees or leases for stone quarries
on council land. However, the councils often have di¢ culty in getting access
to the funds from the proceeds of such activities, as their bank accounts are
in the control of a state government o¢ cial. These weaknesses imply that
the councils are strongly dependent on informal collective action and social
norms.
These problems notwithstanding, villagers are far more secure in their
tenure in comparison to the system of Joint Forest Management between
the state forest departments and forest user groups which has spread widely
in India in the 1990￿ s. Except for the tribal areas in the north-east, the
institution of the forest council is the only one of its kind in India, in having
permanent control over its forest, with legal recognition from the govern-
ment.
The third category of forest land in the area, the unmanaged village
commons8, are a residual category, consisting of all village lands not in pri-
vate hands or in a council forest. They are for the exclusive use of residents
of their villages. The common pool problem is less severe in these lands
than in state forests because the latter are open to the residents of several
8These are o¢ cially known as Civil and Soyam forests and are formally under the
control of the Revenue deparment of the state government, which however, exercises no
control other than to prevent the felling of green trees without permission.
8villages. But the lack of any regulation other than a ban on felling means
that they are subject to overgrazing and other excessive harvesting.
Villagers￿incentive and ability to conserve forests vary by both species,
principally whether the forest is broadleaved (mainly oak in the study area)
or pine, and by property regime. Oaks provide fodder, superior leaf manure,
and are believed to be more e⁄ective than pines in conserving the ￿ ow of
water in springs. Pines provide building timber which oaks do not. However,
in all three property regimes, government permission (not easily obtained)
is needed for the felling of green trees, even for domestic use, and sale is
prohibited. There is, moreover, a con￿ ict between grass production for
grazing and resin tapping in pine forests (due to the use of ￿re). For these
reasons, the incentive to conserve pine forests may be lower for the villagers.
3 The Model
Denote the forest stock in a given area at any time by K. The natural rate
of growth of the stock is given by a function G(K), that is inverted-U shaped
as in Figure 1.
The harvest of forest products from the area per unit of time, (a ￿ ow),
is given by H(X;K); where X denotes the total labor input by all users
per unit of time. The function H is increasing in X and K. There are
diminishing returns to labor (H concave in X). As an individual increases
her harvest by putting in more labor, this means everyone has to go further
(and so put in more labor) to get the same harvest as before. The marginal
product of X is increasing in K. The net growth rate of the stock, taking
account of harvesting, is given by
_ K = G(K) ￿ H(X;K): (1)
Since none of the property regimes is private property, there are n users




where w is the opportunity cost of labor in terms of output. This formulation
means that a user￿ s share of the harvest is proportional to her input share.
9For each K, the static Nash equilibrium of this game results in a total harvest
H￿(K) which is easily seen to be increasing in K (Sethi and Somanathan,
1996).
Restraints on harvesting, which di⁄er across property regimes, change
the game played by users and, in general, will lower each user￿ s (privately)
optimal harvest function and, therefore, the total harvest function H￿(K).
We can think of these restraints as lowering the marginal bene￿t or raising
the marginal cost of harvesting in each regime. Thus, for each property
regime, there correspond harvest functions, H￿
j (K); j = 1;2;3: (Figure 1.)
If, for a given K, the harvest H￿
j (K) exceeds the natural regeneration rate
G(K), then K will decline until H￿
j (K) = G(K), at which time K will reach
a steady state. For a given plot, the steady-state value of K will depend
on the values taken in that plot by the variables that shift H￿(K) and
G(K). The property regime dummies, population density, and distance from
road shift the optimal harvest function, while aspect and other unobserved
ecological variables will shift the regeneration function. Thus the long-run
stock, which is given as an intersection of the curves H￿(K) and G(K), is
determined by the explanatory variables:
K = f(d;x;z)
where d is a vector of dummy variables for the three property regimes that
shift H￿, x is a vector of variables such as population density and the round-
trip time to the nearest road that also shift H￿, and z is a vector of ecological
variables that shift G.
Following a change in property regime, it might take as long as ￿fteen
years before the forest stock reaches a new steady state. Since we need
high-resolution (1 meter) satellite images and ground surveys to measure
forest cover with su¢ cient precision, we are limited to using data from a
recent year, 1998. We restrict ourselves to a sample in which there were no
changes in property regime in the 15 years preceding 1998 and use this to
estimate the e⁄ects of property regimes on the long-run steady-state value
of forest cover.9 While it would have been possible to compare changes in






Figure 1: Harvest and Growth functions
the forest stock in di⁄erent property regimes between two very recent years,
this would pick up only small shifts in the intersections of H￿(K) and G(K)
and would not yield an estimate of the di⁄erence in stocks induced by the
property regimes.
In estimating the e⁄ects of d on K we control for the e⁄ects of x and z
by comparing nearby plots of land so that most of the latter variables will
vary little, by including explicit controls for variables like aspect which do
vary over short distances, and by combining historical information on the
demarcation of property regimes with the observable relation between the
forest stock and some of the ecological (z) variables. This method of identi-
￿cation relies on comparisons of forests close to the boundaries of property
regimes. We also use data at varying distances from the boundaries to check
the robustness of these results to ￿ edge e⁄ects￿ . This is done using standard
regression methods as well as propensity-score matching. In the next sec-
tion we describe the data before describing the identi￿cation strategies and
results in detail.
tested whether the length of time since the property regime changed made a signi￿cant
di⁄erence to the results reported later in the paper. As will be seen below, it did not.
114 Data
4.1 Property regimes
The sample was selected by a random choice of thirteen 1:25000 Survey of
India topographic maps from those available in the area covered by the IRS
satellite image. The ￿rst 10 of these that contained villages were selected
and one was dropped owing to lack of time to survey it. Each valley, (as
we will refer to the areas from the maps), contains about 10-15 villages that
were surveyed, as well as adjoining state forests. After we completed our
￿eld work, data on about 140 contiguous villages in the Gori Ganga valley
which lies in the north-eastern part of the study area were collected by an
NGO, the Foundation for Ecological Security, under the supervision of one
of the authors.10 The addition of the Gori valley e⁄ectively doubled the
sample size. Throughout the paper we report, in addition, results on the
original sample that excludes the Gori valley since the full sample results
will be heavily in￿ uenced by a single subregion and therefore may not be
representative of the entire area.
The location of state forest compartments, (the smallest units of man-
agement), were obtained from the state Forest Department￿ s topographic
maps. Council forest compartment boundaries were obtained from sketch
maps in the possession of the head councillors and were transcribed on to
Survey of India topographic maps during the three years of ￿eld surveys
undertaken for the purpose from 1997 to 2000. Village boundaries were
similarly transcribed on to topographic maps from the state Revenue De-
partment￿ s cadastral survey maps.11 The property regime boundaries were
then entered into a geographic information system so that satellite images
and other digital data described below could be overlaid with errors not
10The Foundation began a⁄orestation work in the area in the late 1990￿ s. We are
grateful to the Foundation for permission to use these data.
11Field surveys were necessary since the council forest and revenue maps are based on
local landmarks and even landmarks that have disappeared and whose former locations
were known only to local residents. Mapping the boundaries was thus a major cartographic
exercise. In the Gori Ganga valley, the village boundaries were not mapped and are roughly
estimated using place names and the proximity of council forests.
12exceeding 70 meters. Unmanaged village forest polygons12 were created by
excluding council forests and cultivated areas shown on the Survey of India
maps from areas within village boundaries. See Figure 2. The broadleaved
and pine areas of each polygon are the ￿nal units of observation. Dummy
variables for the three property regimes are the explanatory variables of
interest.
We also created smaller polygons on both sides of state-council bound-
aries for ￿ner geographic control in state-council forest comparisons. These
are described in Section 5.2.1 below. We refer to the latter data as the
￿ cross-border data￿and the original polygons as the ￿ valley data￿ .
12In a geographic information system, any contiguous area is referred to as a polygon
because of its shape.
13Figure 2: False color composite of the green, red and near-infrared bands
of a segment of the IRS image. Red indicates broadleaved vegetation with
darkness indicating density. Dark green indicates pines, light green degraded
areas, grasslands or cultivation. Council forest (Van Panchayat) boundaries
in blue are overlaid on village boundaries in brown which are overlaid on
State (Reserved) forest compartment boundaries in green. Cross-border
polygons are shown in yellow, each strip being 50 meters wide and 75 meters
from the boundary. To avoid clutter, unmanaged village forest boundaries
are not shown.
144.2 Dependent variables
The two dependent variables are percent crown cover, that is, the percent of
the area covered by tree crowns, in the broadleaved and pine parts of each
polygon respectively. Crown cover in these forests is known to be highly cor-
related with other measures of the forest stock such as bole biomass, total
above ground biomass, and basal cover (Tiwari and Singh, 1984, 1987).13
Crown cover is also of direct importance in improving water percolation,
which reduces runo⁄ and soil erosion and helps maintain the ￿ ow in springs
in the dry season. Our measure of crown cover is obtained from interpre-
tation of an IRS-1D LISS-3 image from May 31 1998, covering an area of
about 20,000 square kilometers. Information collected on the ground during
the course of two years of ￿eldwork from 1997 to 1999 was used as an input
to classify each 23.5 x 23.5 meter pixel from the image into one of the fol-
lowing classes: broadleaved forest (including scrub), pine forest, and other
categories (mainly grasslands and agriculture). Crown cover was visually
measured in a random sample of plots using a grid placed over an April
24, 2000, 1-meter resolution Ikonos satellite image. Band ratios and the
normalized di⁄erence vegetation index (NDVI) were computed for each IRS
pixel.14 Regressions of these measures on a logistic transform of crown cover
and simulations with split samples revealed that the NDVI and the ratio of
bands 2 to 5 were the best predictors of crown cover in broadleaved and pine
forests respectively.15 Accordingly, these were used to predict crown cover
13For example, Tiwari and Singh ￿nd r
2 of 0.98, 0.98, 0.84, 0.95, 0.79, 0.94, and 0.76
between logs of percent crown cover and total biomass for Quercus leucotrichophora (the
commonest oak species), low altitude mixed oak, high altitude mixed oak, pine, pine-
mixed broadleaf, Shorea robusta, and S. robusta mixed with other broadleaved species
respectively. These formations comprise most of the forests in our study area.
14The details of these procedures are given in Prabhakar et. al. (2001). The data for
each IRS pixel consist of 4 numbers: the intensities of re￿ ected radiation in 4 spectral
bands (intervals of wavelength) corresponding to green, red, and two intervals of near
infrared. These are numbered from 2 to 5. Band ratios and the NDVI normalize the data
so that variations in re￿ ectance intensity resulting from topography are removed and what
remains is variation in re￿ ectance at di⁄erent wavelengths that is related to vegetal cover.
15Crown cover measurements were obtained for 199 and 183 broadleaved and pine pixels
respectively. These were randomly split into training (used in the regressions) and assess-
15for each pixel. Broadleaved crown cover for each polygon was then de￿ned
as the mean over the broadleaved pixels of the polygon, with an analogous
de￿nition for pine crown cover.
4.3 Control variables
The control variables include aspect, population density, round-trip time
to the nearest road, and nearby forest stocks. Aspect is the direction in
which a slope faces. North-facing slopes receive less sunlight and so more
soil moisture, in￿ uencing the vegetation. As we will see below, this results in
denser forest. We used elevation data from the topographic maps to create
a continuous aspect variable ranging from 0 for south-facing pixels to 1 for
north-facing pixels with east-facing and west-facing pixels having values of
0.5. Means over the broadleaved pixels in a polygon de￿nes aspect for the
broadleaved regressions with a similar de￿nition for pine regressions.
A population-density surface was constructed as a sum of cones centered
on habitations, with radii of 4 hours round-trip time, and volumes equal
to the populations of the habitations. The population of each village was
obtained from the latest available (1991) Census of India and distributed
over the habitations in each village in proportion to their prominence on
the Survey of India maps. The units for population density are persons per
hectare. Again, means over polygons were extracted for use in the analysis.
The population density of a polygon is thus a measure of its accessibility to
local residents.
A round-trip time variable was constructed by converting kilometers to
round-trip time in hours (1 hour round-trip = 0.845 km) using a regression
coe¢ cient from a survey that we conducted in one of the valleys in the data.
ment (excluded from the regressions) samples with the assessment samples containing 25
pixels, a procedure replicated 1000 times. The mean error in predicted crown cover for
25 pixels is 0.0% with a standard deviation of 5.7% for broadleaved forests while in pine
forests the mean error is 3.2% with a standard deviation of 4.8%. Over 90% of the small
strip polygons used in the state and council forest cross-border comparisons in Section
5.2.1 below contain at least 25 pixels of the relevant forest type (broadleaved or pine). For
the much larger polygons that correspond to compartments of the three property regimes
and contain hundreds of pixels the prediction errors would be still smaller.
16This was used to calculate round-trip times of each pixel from the nearest
road using the locations of roads obtained from the topographic maps and
updated from the Public Works Department￿ s maps. Means over polygons
were extracted for use in the analysis.
For each polygon, nearby state, council and unmanaged village forest
stocks in square kilometers were constructed by summing percent crown
cover multiplied by area for all polygons with centroids within a two-hour
round trip time of the centroid of the given polygon.
Table 1 describes these data.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
State forests Council forests Unmanaged village forests
Polygons 508 240 343
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Area (ha.) 98.4 85.5 75.6 103.6 43.3 84.8
Broadleaved 75.9 22.7 64.9 27.7 49.8 29.3
% Crown Cover
Pine % Crown 33.9 27.3 42.2 31.8 37.9 30.8
Cover
% forest 97.2 7.6 93.2 13.1 83.4 22.2
% Broadleaved 67.9 30.3 75.7 23.2 69.07 25.15
% Pine 29.2 29.6 17.4 21.3 14.3 18.9
Aspect .499 .234 .487 .219 .494 .223
Altitude (km) 1.68 .47 1.56 .42 1.44 .40
Pop. density .673 .834 1.41 .93 1.57 1.16
Time to Road 2.13 1.93 1.55 1.68 1.45 1.48
Nearby SF stock 2.93 1.79 .84 1.25 .91 1.38
Nearby CF stock .211 .549 1.13 1.25 1.21 1.37
Nearby UVF stock .159 .431 .95 1.06 .71 .98
Note: SF= State Forest, CF = Council Forest, UVF = Unmanaged Village Forest.
Aspect ranges from south-facing (0) to north-facing (1), population density is in
persons per hectare, round-trip time to road is in hours, and nearby stocks are in
square kilometers. 100 ha = 1 sq. km.
17It is apparent that in broadleaved forests, crown cover is higher in state
forests than in council forests, which in turn have higher crown cover than
unmanaged village forests. Pine forests, unlike broadleaved forests, do not
have naturally closed canopies and crown cover is generally much lower with
council forests having the highest, followed by unmanaged village forests and
then state forests. Notice also that population density in state forests is lower
than in council forests, which in turn have a lower population density than
unmanaged village forests. State forests are also further from roads than
the other two categories. A fact not shown in this table is that broadleaved
state forests have a mean population density of 0.52, about half that of pine
state forests, because many are situated on mountains that rise above the
cultivated zone and are thus less accessible. Population density in council
and unmanaged village forests does not vary much with forest type.
5 Estimation and Results
5.1 Formal institution vs. no institution
In this section, we ask whether having a formal institution, the council, helps
to maintain forest cover in village forests. We estimate separate equations
for broadleaved and pine forests. Our estimating equations are:
~ Ki = ￿1 ~ Di + ￿ ~ Xi + ~ "i (2)
where Ki denotes percent crown cover in the broadleaved (respectively, pine)
part of polygon i, D is a dummy for council forests, and X is a vector of
variables including aspect, population density and its square, and round-
trip time to road and its square. The accents over the variables represent
deviations of variables from the mean over all polygons in a village. This
removes any omitted variables that do not vary within village boundaries.
State forests, which lie outside village boundaries, are excluded from this
regression. The results are reported in Table 2.
18Table 2: Unmanaged vs. Council Forest: Village ￿xed e⁄ects
% Crown cover % Crown cover % of area
(broadleaved) (pine) forested
Council dummy 11.9 (2.0)*** 2.4 (2.7) 7.3 (1.6)***
Aspect 29.4 (6.1)*** 10.0 (7.7) 14.7 (4.8)***
Pop density -12.4 (5.0)** 6.1 (10.5) -6.9 (3.9)
Pop density sq. 0.65 (0.48) -1.4 (2.8) 0.02 (0.38)
Time to road -0.5 ( 3.1) -10.8 (4.2)** 1.8 (2.4)
Time to road sq. .58 (0.55) 1.47 (0.77)* -0.10 (0.43)
# obs 573 498 578
# villages 264 243 264
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 1, 2 and 3 *￿ s denote signi￿cance at the 10,
5 and 1 percent levels respectively.
It is clear that broadleaved council forests are denser than broadleaved
unmanaged forests in the same villages, with crown cover being nearly 12
percentage points higher in the former. In pine forests, which are about a
quarter of the forest area, there is no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence in
crown cover between council and unmanaged village forests. Given the in-
centive structure induced by the council forest rules (discussed above in Sec-
tion 3) it is not surprising that in comparison to unmanaged village forests,
councils are markedly more e⁄ective at protecting broadleaved forests than
pine forests. Councils also have about 7 percent more of their land under
forest (rather than grassland or agriculture). In the speci￿cations in Table
2 we included only those controls in which some within-village variation is
likely. Including the other control variables from Table 1 or dropping these
controls does not a⁄ect the coe¢ cients on the council dummy more than
slightly.16
16When we include the age of the council as a regressor, we ￿nd that it is signi￿cant
only in broadleaved forests at the 6 percent level with older councils having higher crown
cover. A 40-year old council forest (the mean age in the sample) is predicted to have
broadleaved crown cover that is 16 percentage points higher than an unmanaged village
forest. However, the e⁄ect of council age seems to operate only for young council forests.
Age is not signi￿cant (p > 0:20) if only councils older than 15 years are included in the
regression.
19Similar results are obtained if we exclude the Gori valley (in which village
boundaries are only approximate), except that the di⁄erence in crown cover
between council and unmanaged broadleaved forests rises to 16 percentage
points.
Next, we test for possible endogeneity of the property regimes. Speci￿-
cally, we check whether land more suitable for dense forest was more likely
to be included in council rather than unmanaged village forests. Suppose
~ Ki = ￿1 ~ Di + ￿ ~ Xi + ￿ ~ Zi + ~ "i (3)
where ~ Zi is unobserved, ￿ > 0; and ~ Zi uncorrelated with each ~ Xi:17 We will
have over-estimated the e⁄ect of council management ￿1 in Table 2 above if
and only if Cov( ~ Di; ~ Zi) > 0. Recall that council forests were demarcated at
the villagers￿request after the creation of the state forests, and that unman-
aged village forests are left over community lands. The positive correlation
between ~ Zi and council management can arise in exactly two ways. First,
if, at the time of demarcation of a council forest, villagers chose lands with
denser forest for council management, then council forests will tend to have
lands with characteristics that favor dense forest. Second, villagers may
have directly preferred high values of ~ Zi.
To examine the ￿rst possibility, we ￿rst see which observable characteris-
tics that vary within villages favor dense forest. Table 3 reports regressions
of crown cover in broadleaved and pine forests, separately in each of the
three property regimes. The results from the whole sample show that as-
pect has a strong positive and signi￿cant impact on crown cover. Excluding
the Gori valley data, we get similar results, except that the coe¢ cient on
aspect in the pine regressions, while still positive, is roughly halved and not
signi￿cant. About 75% of the forest area is broadleaved with the rest being
coniferous.
17Without loss of generality we can con￿ne ourselves to only those omitted factors that
are orthogonal to the other explanatory variables.
20Table 3: 2SLS with valley dummies
Broadleaved crown cover Pine crown cover
SF CF UVF SF CF UVF
Aspect 21.9*** 40.9*** 29.2*** 14.13** 29.9*** 20.16***
(4.9) (7.01) (6.3) (6.007) ( 9.06) (6.93)
Population -19.5*** -15.32** -11.6*** -1.14 -10.8 -10.05
density (4.09) (6.58) (3.6) ( 4.27) (9.1) (7.58)
Population 2.55*** 2.11 1.96*** -1.13* .81 1.00
density sq (.67) (1.62) (.69) (.59) (2.07) (1.53)
Time to -.54 -2.8 -2.44 -1.51 -8.2* -9.69***
Road (1.2) ( 3.3) (2.16 ) (2.51) ( 4.75) (3.71)
Time to .01 .48 .85*** -.07 1.32* 1.09*
Road sq (.13) (.45) (.31) (.35) (.75) (.66)
Nearby -.87 .98 1.64 1.76 -2.06 2.87*
CF stock (2.03) (1.01) (1.2 ) (2.33) ( 2.10 ) (1.65)
Nearby 2.60*** 1.18 -1.12 -.17 .078 -.125
SF stock ( .67) (1.39) ( 1.32 ) (.98) (1.95) ( 1.66 )
Nearby -3.72 -1.20 .25 1.88 -1.65 -.38
UVF stock ( 2.44 ) ( 1.84) ( 1.76 ) ( 4.34 ) (2.54) ( 3.32 )
Obs 355 227 341 318 186 224
Villages 140 211 126 156
R2 0.44 0.47 0.50 0.39 0.34 0.34
Note: SF= State Forest, CF = Council Forest, UVF = Unmanaged Village Forest.
Nearby forest stocks are instrumented by the respective areas of polygons with
centroids within a two-hour round trip time. Robust standard errors clustered
by village. 1, 2 and 3 *￿ s denote signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels
respectively.
The importance of aspect for crown cover means that if villagers pref-
erentially included land with characteristics likely to result in dense forest
in council forests, then council forests are more likely to be found on north-
facing slopes than unmanaged village forests. To examine this possibility
we run regressions of the council dummy variable on aspect using a sample
containing only council and unmanaged village forests. Likewise, if dense
forests were preferentially included in council forests, then council forests
21would be more north-facing than unmanaged village forests. So we also run
regressions of aspect on the council dummy. The results are reported in
Table 4 below.
Table 4: Council vs. Unmanaged Forest and Aspect
PF dummy PF dummy Aspect Aspect
Logit Conditional Logit OLS Fixed E⁄ects
Aspect -0.17 -0.64
(0.38) (0.80)
PF dummy -0.01 -0.013
(0.01) (0.019)
# obs 589 331 589 588
# villages 270 97 270 270
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3 shows that, in actual fact, north-facing areas were no more likely
to be included in council forests than south-facing areas and council forests
do not have higher average values of aspect than unmanaged village forests.
The coe¢ cient on aspect is not signi￿cant in either of the two regressions
of the council dummy on aspect. The second regression reports the results
of a conditional logit model which exploits only within-village variation in
aspect. Accordingly, villages in which there is no variation in the council
dummy, that is, which do not have both council and unmanaged polygons,
are dropped, which is why there are fewer observations. The other two
regressions (the second uses village ￿xed e⁄ects) show that aspect is not
signi￿cantly higher in council as compared to unmanaged village forests.18
We conclude that there is no evidence to indicate villagers chose denser
forests for inclusion in council forests. (This result is in contrast to that
with regard to the choice of lands to include in state forests, as we shall see
in the next section.)
18The regressions reported in Table 4 include the Gori valley data in which village
boundaries are only roughly accurate. When we exclude the Gori valley data, we ￿nd
that the coe¢ cients in all four regressions are insigni￿cant with p-values exceeding 0.65
in every case.
22We now turn to the second possible source of correlation between ~ Z and
council management. Selection of lands more suitable for dense forest in
council forests could also have occured if villagers preferred higher values of
~ Z for its own sake. Villagers￿interest in the council forests arises largely
from forests products: fuel, fodder, manure and timber. Species composition
is the only factor apart from density that might have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on
their availability or quality. However, the scope for selection on the basis
of species composition is virtually nil in coniferous forests, these consisting
almost exclusively of a single species: the chir pine (Pinus roxburghii), while
if there was any such selection in broadleaved forests, it is unlikely to a⁄ect
crown cover since all broadleaved forests in the region tend to form closed
canopies when undisturbed (Singh and Singh, 1987, p118). It is unlikely,
therefore, that such selection could account for the di⁄erence in crown cover
in council and unmanaged broadleaved forests that was observed in Table
2.19
We conclude that having a formal institution to manage community
forests does make a di⁄erence to forest conservation, as does the incentive
structure induced by the interaction of rules and ecology. Broadleaved vil-
lage forests have been better preserved under council management than no
management, while pine village forests have not.
5.2 Common property vs State Property
5.2.1 Cross-border data
To examine the e⁄ectiveness of village councils as compared to the state For-
est Department in forest conservation, we examine some 270 pairs of strips
19We examined the ￿les maintained on council forests in the district government o¢ ces
but descriptions of the forests at the time of council formation were too few to draw
inferences about the nature of lands selected for inclusion. Out of 83 council forests for
which we could ￿nd records, 11 were formed on degraded lands, 15 with dense forests, and
there is insu¢ cient information on the remainder to tell. There is no indication in the
records that particular broadleaved species were favored for inclusion. Several petitions
mentioned the threat of forest destruction or ongoing degradation as a reason for council
formation.
23of land on opposite sides of state and council forest boundaries. Each strip
polygon is 50 meters wide and 75 meters from the boundary. The 150-meter
gap between strips is large enough to eliminate the possibility that errors
in geo-registration of the satellite image would result in mis-identi￿cation
of the property regime. The small distance between polygons in each pair
ensures that geographic variables (with the exception of aspect, on which,
more below), do not di⁄er very much between the polygons in a pair as can
be seen from Table 5 below. While the di⁄erences in nearby forest stock,
population density, and round-trip time to the nearest road between council
and state polygons in each pair are systematic and statistically signi￿cant,
they are small. As might be expected, state forests have larger nearby forest
stocks, lower population densities, and are further from roads, due to their
greater distance from villages.
Table 5: Cross-border data: summary statistics
Mean S.D. Di⁄erence # Pairs
(Council - State)
Mean S.D.
Aspect (BL) 0.53 0.26 -0.15*** 0.02 242
Aspect (pine) 0.47 0.27 -0.10*** 0.03 91
Nearby forest stock 4.19 2.32 -0.20*** 0.07 276
Pop. density 0.91 0.95 0.04*** 0.01 276
Time to Road 2.49 2.52 -0.07*** 0.02 276
BL crown cover 77.6 28.6 -5.4*** 1.5 242
Pine crown cover 36.4 33.6 -5.3** 2.5 91
Note: 1, 2 and 3 *￿ s denote signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.
The exception is aspect, which, given the mountainous terrain varies
considerably even locally. In fact, the Forest Settlement O¢ cers who drew
the boundaries of the state forests often found it convenient to situate them
along ridges and streams, thus generating di⁄erences in aspect across the
boundaries (Sti⁄e, 1915). What is of greater importance is that the di⁄er-
ences in aspect are large and systematic with north-facing slopes much more
likely to be in state rather than council forests. The strong positive in￿ uence
24of aspect on forest density that we noted in Table 3 suggests that the set-
tlement o¢ cers systematically reserved land more suitable for dense forest
for inclusion in state forests. One might suspect that other considerations
might have played a role in determining the large aspect di⁄erential. For ex-
ample, it is well known (and borne out in our data) that pine forests tend to
be found on the drier south-facing slopes while oaks and their broad-leaved
associates are more often found on north-facing slopes. So a preference for
oaks on the part of the Forest Settlement O¢ cers could also have gener-
ated the observed aspect di⁄erential between council and state forests. But,
the forest settlement reports (Sti⁄e, 1915; Nelson, 1916) and Guha￿ s (1983,
1989) examination of other government documents from the time make it
clear that the colonial government was much more interested in pine forests
because they were commercially more valuable than oaks and most other
broadleaved species. The fact that, despite this, boundaries were drawn
in a way that tended to leave state forests on the north-facing slopes, sug-
gests that considerations of forest density took precedence. Table 5 shows
that the aspect di⁄erential is smaller in areas in which pines are present, an
observation that is consistent with this story.
Table 6 presents our comparison of crown cover in council and state
forests from the cross-border data. The estimated equations (one each for
broadleaved and coniferous forests) are
dKi = ￿0 + ￿1dXi + d"i
where dyi is the di⁄erence in crown cover between council and state forest
polygons in pair i, ￿0 the parameter of principal interest, is the expected
di⁄erence in crown cover conditional on no di⁄erence in other variables, and
￿1 is the vector of common coe¢ cients on the control variables in state and
council forests. Neighbouring forest stocks, when included in the model, are
not instrumented since the strip polygons are quite small, and are, therefore,
unlikely to have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on neighbouring stocks.
25Table 6: Cross-border regressions of di⁄erences in percent crown
cover between council and state forests
Broadleaved Broadleaved Pine Pine
Constant 1.2 -0.7 -2.4 -4.0
(2.8) (2.6) (3.6) (2.8)
Aspect 32.2 *** 30.5*** 12.2 12.9




density sq (2.85) (10.3)
Time to 10.3 5.7
Road (6.3) (11.8)
Nearby -0.24 -1.7
forest stock (0.82) (2.1)
# pairs 242 242 91 91
# councils 68 68 44 44
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by council Forest, in parentheses. 1, 2
and 3 *￿ s denote signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.
The coe¢ cients on the constant term are the ones of interest. It is seen
from the second column that in broadleaved forests, the most favourable
for community management, council control does not have a signi￿cantly
di⁄erent e⁄ect on forest density than state control. In the third column
we exclude the variables that are not signi￿cant in this regression, and the
di⁄erence now turns negative although it remains small and not signi￿cant.
Given the small but systematic di⁄erences in the excluded variables, this
is exactly as we would expect. In pine forests, the results are very simi-
lar. These regressions produce very similar results if we distinguish between
neighboring forest stocks in state, council and unmanaged village forests and
so we do not report those separately.20
20We ran another set of regressions which included the age of a council in years as
an explanatory variable (and added councils younger than 15 years to the sample). The
coe¢ cient on age is not signi￿cant and the coe¢ cients on the constant term remain in-
26If the e⁄ects of a control variable on broadleaved or pine crown cover
are di⁄erent in state and council forests then the regressions above are mis-
speci￿ed. To check this, we ran regressions (discussed further in Section
5.2.2 below) of crown cover on the explanatory variables using the valley
data, including squared terms and found that only the coe¢ cient on as-
pect in broadleaved forests di⁄ered signi￿cantly between state and council
forests. To accomodate this in the cross-border data, we ran a regression
of broadleaved crown cover on the explanatory variables using pair ￿xed
e⁄ects and allowing the coe¢ cient of aspect to be di⁄erent in state and
council forests.21 We ￿nd that the di⁄erence in the aspect coe¢ cient is very
small and not signi￿cant in these data. However, we used the regression to
predict the increase in crown cover that would result if state forests in the
cross-border data were under council management. We ￿nd this to be 1.3
percentage points with a standard error of 2.0, not a signi￿cant increase,
and a result almost identical with that in Table 6.
All the results reported above are qualitatively similar if we exclude the
Gori valley. Finally, we also examined the di⁄erence in the percentage of
the area under forest or scrub and ￿nd it to be ￿0:4 percentage points, not
signi￿cant. We conclude that state forests do not have greater forest density
than comparable council forests, at least along the boundaries. However,
it is possible that council forests are denser than comparable state forests
because of the evidence given in Table 5 that suggests that state forest lands
were chosen in a way that favors higher forest density. While we controlled
for the large di⁄erence in aspect in our regressions we cannot control for
other factors like soil characteristics that may vary at small spatial scales
and could have similar e⁄ects.
signi￿cant at the 10 percent level in both broadleaved and pine forests. Most councils for
which we have data are older than 15 years.
21 ~ Ki = ￿1 ~ Di + ￿ ~ Xi + ~ "i
where the accents denote deviations from the means of cross-border pairs and the X
variables are those in Table 6 with the addition of an interaction between the council
dummy D and aspect.
275.2.2 Valley data
While the cross-border sample o⁄ers a powerful way to control for unob-
servable di⁄erences between state and council forests, it is possible that it is
not representative of the larger area. O¢ cials of the state forest department
sometimes argue that the presence of nearby state forests induces villagers
to harvest from them while conserving their council forests. It should be
pointed out that this argument suggests that in the long run, forest stocks
in state forests could be raised by transferring them to council control since
a higher harvest ￿ ow would be possible from a higher stock (unless the
stock is already higher than that corresponding to the maximum sustain-
able yield, the peak of G(K) in Figure 1).22 Nevertheless, in this section,
we will examine the possibility that, for whatever reason, the cross-border
data underestimate crown cover in state forests relative to council forests.
Parametric analysis First, we run the following regressions separately








￿lXli + Di + Di
X
l
￿lXli + "i (4)
where Vk is a dummy variable for valley k, the explanatory variables Xl
include aspect, the ￿rst three powers of population density, the round-trip
time to road and its square, and nearby council, state, and unmanaged
village forest stocks, and D is a dummy for council forests. The coe¢ cients
on the nearby stocks and their interactions with the council dummy are
reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 7 below.
22Most of those who make this argument seem to have missed this implication.
28Table 7: Crown cover in state and council forests, valley data
Broadleaved crown cover Pine crown cover
Nearby -0.91 -0.47
CF Stock (1.98) (2.33)
D*Nearby 2.90 -0.70
CF Stock (2.08) (2.96)
Nearby 2.53 -0.56
SF Stock (.66) (1.09)
D*Nearby -2.18 0.68




Note: Reports some of the coe¢ cient estimates from equation (4). CF = Council
Forest, SF = State Forest. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by council
forest. Nearby forest stocks and their interactions with the council dummy (D) are
instrumented by areas.
We begin by noting the insigni￿cance, (and in broadleaved forests, also
the negative sign), of the coe¢ cient on D*(Nearby SF Stock). This means
that in council forests, raising the level of nearby state forest stocks does not
raise crown cover.23 Similarly the insigni￿cance of the coe¢ cient on Nearby
CF Stock indicates that crown cover in state forests does not fall if their
proximity to council forests increases. The proposition that council forests
have higher forest density at the expense of nearby state forests ￿nds no
support in the data.
A more general criticque of the cross-border comparison is that while
it is suitable for evaluating the e⁄ect of a transfer of state forests to coun-
cil control at the boundary, a more realistic policy change could result in
transfers of state forests to council control across the board. In that case,
we need to account for the fact that when a polygon changes from state
to council management, so will its neighbors. Therefore, if the e⁄ect of
23All nearby stocks are instrumented by nearby areas, so the variation being measured
in them in these equations is exogenous.
29nearby state forest stocks on a state forest polygon is higher than the e⁄ect
of nearby council forest stocks on a council forest polygon, then across the
board transfers could result in lower crown cover even if marginal transfers
would not. However, we see from Table 7 (and con￿rm with an F-test)
that the coe¢ cients on D*Nearby CF Stock and Nearby SF Stock are not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent (p > 0:2) in both broadleaved and pine regressions, so
this hypothesis is not true either. All of these results hold in the sample
that excludes the Gori valley. Thus there is no evidence to indicate that the
cross-border sample is non-representative.
Propensity score matching Next, we use propensity scores to match
state forest (￿ treatment group￿ ) polygons in the valley data with comparable
council forest (￿ control group￿ ) polygons and then test for a di⁄erence in
crown cover. The propensity score for a polygon is the probability that it
is in the treatment group (in our case, a state forest) conditional on the
values of the explanatory variables. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed
that if there is no selection bias conditional on the n-dimensional vector
of explanatory variables, then there is no selection bias conditional on the
one-dimensional propensity score. In our case, this means that if there is no
variable that a⁄ects crown cover and is correlated with assignment to state
forest other than the ones used in the computation of the propensity score,
then by computing the mean di⁄erence in crown cover between state and
council forests with the same propensity scores, we get an unbiased estimate
of the e⁄ect of state forest management on crown cover relative to council
forest management.
The average di⁄erences are reported in Table 8.24 The ￿rst row reports
24We use Leuven and Sianesi￿ s (2003) Stata program psmatch2. The unbiasedness of
the estimate depends on the use of the correct propensity score function. Rosenbaum
and Rubin￿ s (1985) necessary ￿ balancing￿condition that the expectation of the vector of
explanatory variables conditional on the propensity score be the same for the treatment
and control groups o⁄ers a way to check for an incorrectly estimated propensity score
function. We use Hotelling mean-squared tests to check that the expectations are equal
for each of the ￿ve quintiles of the propensity score functions. After including the higher
order terms mentioned in the note to Table 8, the hypothesis of equal means in all ￿ve
30the mean di⁄erence by matching each state forest polygon with the council
forest polygon that has the nearest propensity score. Those state forest poly-
gons with a propensity score higher than that of any council forest polygon
are excluded so as to avoid comparisons between polygons with propensity
scores that are far apart. The third row also excludes such polygons and
matches each state forest polygon with a weighted average of council for-
est polygons using the Epanichnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.6. The
second row matches state forest polygons with an average of council forest
polygons with propensity scores within 0.01 of their propensity scores.
Table 8: Mean di⁄erence in percent crown cover between council
and state forests matched by propensity score.
Matching method Broadleaved Pine
Nearest neighbor 1.8 (3.0) 14.6 (4.7)
75% 75%
Radius =0.01 0.5 (2.7) 12.0 (4.0)
79% 74%
Kernel 1.1 (2.2) 9.2 (3.5)
75% 75%
Treated observations 355 318
All observations 582 504
Note: Percentages refer to the percentage of treated observations (state forest
polygons) used in the calculation of the mean di⁄erence. Figures in parentheses are
standard errors estimated from 1000 bootstrap replications. In broadleaved forests,
the variables used in the estimation of the propensity score functions were the
￿rst three powers of population density, the neighboring forest stock, broadleaved
aspect, and time to the nearest road. In pine forests, the square of the time to
the nearest road was used in addition. The number of treated observations and
the percentage of treated observations refer only to the point estimates since the
propensity score function is re-estimated in each bootstrap sample and accordingly,
the region of common support changes.
Table 8 indicates that council and state forests have virtually the same
broadleaved crown cover since the di⁄erences are small and not statistically
signi￿cant. In fact, the estimates using propensity scores are remarkably
quintiles could not be rejected at the 10 percent level.
31close to the point estimate from Table 6 that used the cross-border data
controlling for di⁄erences in the relevant variables. In pine forests, on the
other hand, council forests are seen to have higher crown cover and the
di⁄erences are large and statistically signi￿cant.25
These results pertain only to the state forests that had close enough
matches in terms of the propensity score to be used in the comparison.
However, it may be remarked that more than 95% of those excluded have
a population density below 0.3 persons per hectare with a mean of less
than 0.07 persons per hectare as compared to a mean of 0.67 for all state
forests and of 1.41 for all council forests. Therefore, it appears quite unlikely
that anthropogenic pressure would result in lower crown cover if these were
transferred to council forests.
Results for the sample excluding the Gori valley were similar, with the
exception of the pine regression. Here, instead of ￿nding a positive and
signi￿cant e⁄ect of council management, we ￿nd a positive (4:4 percentage
points) but insigni￿cant e⁄ect.
We conclude this section by noting that the parametric analysis of the
valley data provide no support for the hypothesis that the cross-border data
understate crown cover in state forests relative to council forests because
of edge e⁄ects, while propensity score matching analysis of the valley data
provide additional evidence that council management results in crown cover
no lower, and in the case of pines, possibly higher, than state management.
5.3 Costs
Table 9 compares the costs per hectare of administering council and state
forests in 2002-03. A comparison of the totals in the last row shows that
state forests cost about 13 times as much per unit area to administer as did
25It may appear odd that councils do better than the state in pine forests in which
they may have less of a stake than in broadleaved forests. It could be that (pine) state
forests su⁄er more from the con￿ ict between grass production and resin-tapping because
there is more resin-tapping in state forests and because villagers are less willing to render
assistance in putting out ￿res in the state forests. This may not show up in the cross-
border data because villagers are more motivated to control ￿res close to their own council
forests. Other explanations are, of course, possible.
32council forests. In our sample, 70% of councils appointed watchmen for all
or part of the year and this constituted the bulk of councils￿expenditures. A
few councils are known to have all villagers patrol the forest by rotation, but
this seems to be rare.26 We have not attempted to calculate the opportunity
cost of time involved in council meetings or other activities by members.
However, these are probably quite small since meetings are held not oftener
than once a month and mostly less often. They are probably held during
slack times and involve only the 5 to 9 members of the council.
Apart from the councils￿ own expenditures, the Uttaranchal govern-
ment￿ s Revenue department spent 7 rupees per hectare on the o¢ ces of
the forest council Inspectors in the Kumaun Division, most of this being
wage costs, while the Uttaranchal Forest department spent 9 rupees per
hectare on its Forestry and forest council training school. We have assumed
that all of the training school￿ s money is spent on councils thus probably
overstating actual expenditure on councils. It is also doubtful, given what is
known about the functioning of councils and the Forest Department, that the
tranining school would actually contribute to forest conservation by coun-
cils. Moreover, the Forest department￿ s Forestry and council training school
was set up only in the mid 1990￿ s. So for most of the years preceding 1998,
the year in which we measure crown cover, expenditures on council forests
would have been lower.
26If we make the extreme assumption that in all councils with an annual frequency of
meetings greater than 2, rotational guarding substituted for watchmen, and the value of
time was same as for watchmen, then the cost per hectare for councils increases to 75 and
the ratio of state to council cost per hectare costs falls to 11.5.
33Table 9: Expenditure in Rupees per hectare on forest
administration in 2002-03.
council forests state forests
Watchman￿ s wages 43 Wage payments 398
Other exp by councils 6 Other exp 464
Govt exp on councils 16
Total 65 Total 862
Sources: Data on expenditure on state forests by forest division and areas of forest
divisions, as well as data on Government expenditure on councils and the area under
council forests in Kumaun were provided by the Government of Uttaranchal and
pertain to the forest divisions in the Garhwal, Almora, Bageshwar, Pithoragarh,
Champawat and Nainital districts. The data on expenditure per unit area by
councils are from our survey.
Salaries also dominate the Forest department￿ s expenditure on state
forests. 2002￿ 03 was the only ￿nancial year for which we could get data
for all the components of expenditure on administration. Using data from
1995-96, we found that state forests cost 403 rupees per hectare in 2002
rupees to administer (Government of Uttar Pradesh, 1999). This is about 6
times the 2002-03 ￿gure for the cost of council forests indicating that there
has been a sharp rise in real expenditure on state forests in the last few
years. On the other hand, between 1970-71 (the earliest year for which we
could ￿nd the data) and 1994-95, real expenditure by the Forest department
on the region that later became Uttaranchal fell by 43%. This latter ￿gure
includes all expenditure, although expenditure on state forests constituted
the bulk of the Forest department￿ s spending.
Thus, we may conclude that over the roughly three decades preceding the
year we measured crown cover, the cost of administering the state forests was
several times that of administering the council forests. A rough calculation
shows that the annual savings that would have accrued if all state forests in
the area were council forests are about 60% of the value of annual domestic
consumption of ￿rewood in the area in 2002. Since state forests constitute
not more than 60% of the forest area and are less accessible than unmanaged
village and council forests, this means that the savings from council control
would be of the same order of magnitude as the entire annual ￿rewood
34production from the state forests.27
6 Conclusions
This research is the ￿rst to directly examine the long-run e⁄ects of decen-
tralization of management and control on forest stocks. We studied the
e⁄ects of having a formal institution, the village forest council, to manage
village commons (using geographic, historical and ecological information for
identi￿cation) and ￿nd that it positively a⁄ects forest density as measured
by crown cover in broadleaved forests although not in pine forests. We
also examined the e⁄ects of village council versus state control of forests
using propensity score matching in addition to a geographic identi￿cation
method and ￿nd that council control was no worse and possibly better in
terms of crown cover. In other words, decentralized management was as
good and perhaps better at forest conservation than centralized manage-
ment. Moreover, decentralized management by forest councils cost an order
of magnitude less per unit area than centralized forest management by the
state government.
It is likely that ￿ ow bene￿ts from council forests are of greater value
than from comparable state-managed forests even though they have the
same crown cover on average, since the former are managed locally by vil-
lagers for their own bene￿t. The harvesting of fodder, fuelwood, and other
products from state forests, on the other hand, is more likely to involve con-
￿ icts, illegalities, and the costs associated with improper timing and lack of
coordination of harvests. Given the much higher cost of administering state
forests, we conclude that there is a strong case for reversing the 1972 change
in the council rules that disallowed the extension and formation of council
forests out of state forests.
27This assumes that the savings calculated from Table 9 are distributed to all 2.263
million residents of the districts containing the Reserved forests in question. Figures
for annual per capita consumption expenditure (7437 in 2002 rupees) and the value of
￿rewood consumption as a proportion of domestic consumption (0.030) are computed
from the National Sample Survey of 1999-2000 (55th round) and the Consumer Price
Index for agricultural labourers.
35This study has shown that state control has been very expensive because
of the cost of supporting a large hierarchical bureaucracy while not doing
any better and possibly worse than community management on the resource-
conservation front. It also highlights the importance of putting in place an
appropriate institution which facilitates community regulation of resource
use. However, it does not o⁄er much solace to those hoping that devolution
will lead to large reversals of forest degradation. It does not appear that
the system actually in place did very much more for conservation than did
the state administration. However, it should be kept in mind that the same
centralizing rule change that prohibited extension of council management
into state forests also took away the councils￿powers to raise revenue by
selling timber and other forest products. This may well have had the e⁄ect
of reducing the village councils￿incentive to conserve forests as well as their
ability to do so by making it more di¢ cult for them to pay watchmen.
Reforming the forest council system to this extent is a matter of a simple
rule change, and may be easier than reforming the state forest deparment.
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